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The central bank as the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) is faced with a trade off 
between the stability of the financial system and the “moral hazard” of banks. In this 
paper we explore how this trade off was dealt with by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in the 
pre-war period, and how LLR lending by the BOJ affected the financial system. In 
particular, this paper focuses on the following two stylized facts of Japanese financial 
history. First, the BOJ actively intervened in the market as the LLR under the unstable 
financial system in the 1920s. Second, in this period, the financial market worked well 
to sort out inefficient banks through failures.   
In providing an LLR loan, the BOJ adopted the policy of favoring those banks that 
had an already established transaction relationship with the BOJ. At the same time, 
the BOJ was selective about which banks it would enter into a transaction relationship 
with. That is, the BOJ chose the banks it would conduct transactions with based on 
criteria that included profitability, liquidity, quality of assets, and the personal assets of 
directors. Furthermore, the BOJ did not hesitate to suspend transaction relationships 
with those banks whose performance declined. 
This policy enabled the BOJ to act as the LLR without impairing the function of the 
market to sort out inefficient banks. Whereas the transaction relationship with the BOJ 
affected a bank’s survivability, the effect was not across the board. That is, the 
transaction relationship did not increase the survivability of a bank directly, but it 
increased the influence of profitability and liquidity on survivability, especially in a 
period of financial crisis. This implies that the BOJ bailed out only those transaction 
counterparts that were profitable and prudent when the financial system was especially 
unstable. It is suggested that through concentrating LLR lending on its transaction 
counterparts, the BOJ could successfully bail out only those banks which were illiquid 
but solvent, and thereby avoided the moral hazard that the LLR policy might otherwise 
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          Since Bagehot [1873], the central banks of many countries have come to adopt the 
role of Lender of Last Resort (LLR), and we have rich store of theoretical and empirical 
literature on LLR (Bordo 1990; Goodhart 1985; Goodhart and Huang 2005; Miron 1986, 
among others).  According to the “classical view” of LLR, the Central Bank should 
prevent illiquid but solvent banks from failing by lending money to them at a penalty 
rate (Bordo 1990, p.19). The fact that LLR has been effective in preventing bank panics 
is well established (Bordo 1990; Butliewicz 1995; Miron 1995). On the other hand, as 
Goodhart [1985] argues, it is difficult for the Central Bank to discern between solvent 
and insolvent banks. Therefore, the Central Bank as the LLR is faced with a trade off 
between the stability of the financial system and the moral hazard of banks (Cordella 
and  Yayati  2003).   
     In this paper we explore how this trade off was dealt with by the Bank of Japan 
(BOJ) in the period before the Second World War, and how LLR lending by the BOJ 
affected the financial system. As described in the next section, the financial system 
became unstable in 1920s Japan, and the BOJ actively played the role of LLR. We 
explore how the BOJ selected the banks to be bailed out and what implications that the 
BOJ’s policy had.     
In the literature on Japanese financial history, Ehiro [2000] and Ito [2003] 
review the role of the BOJ as the LLR in this period. As they point out, the LLR loan by 
the BOJ was a major policy tool for stabilizing the financial system in the 1920s. In 
another strand, Yabushita and Inoue [1993] found that the probability of bank closure 
under the financial crisis in 1927 was negatively correlated with the profitability and 
the ratio of risky assets of a bank. Okazaki[2002] and Okazaki, Sawada and Yokoyama 
[2005] confirmed the result using the data covering wider range of bank exits. 
Yabushita and Inoue interpreted the above result that the bank closures occurring 
during the financial crisis of 1927 were not contagious1. In the context of this paper, it 
suggests that the LLR loans by the BOJ successfully prevented financial crises from 
becoming contagious. Also, the negative correlation between bank performance and 
bank closure suggests that the LLR loans did not impair the selection mechanism of 
the market, by bailing out insolvent banks. In other words, it is suggested that the 
BOJ could deal with the above trade off fairly well.     
In order to understand how this occurred, it should be noted that the BOJ was 
                                                  
1  Korenaga et al [2001] reexamined their proposition discriminating two waves of 
bank closures in 1927 to find that the second wave was contagious, while the first wave 
was not.    It is important to explore how the LLR loan by the BOJ affected on these 
attributes of the bank closures.       selective in its provision of LLR loans, and that LLR loans were crucial for banks (Ishii 
1980). Ishii [1980] pointed out that those banks which had already had transaction 
relationships with the BOJ were the main recipients of LLR loans, and those banks, in 
turn, were basically large–sized ones2. Referring to this fact, in this paper, I will 
examine how the BOJ selected its transaction counterparts, using the internal 
documents of the BOJ and bank-level quantitative data.   
The BOJ archives hold the original documents on the individual openings and 
closings of transaction relationships with private banks in the pre-war period. We look 
at how the BOJ evaluated the banks which applied to open a transaction relationship, 
and how it made the decision to approve or reject such applications. On the other hand, 
Nihon Ginko Enkakushi (The History of the BOJ) contains comprehensive records on 
the individual transaction relationships between the BOJ and private banks. Based on 
these materials, we constructed a database of the transaction relationships, and 
matched it with a database of the financial data of individual banks. Using the dataset, 
we econometrically analyze the determinants of the transaction relationship between 
the BOJ and private banks. Also, we investigate how the transaction relationships 
with the BOJ impacted on the financial system. Specifically, we analyze the effects of 
the relationship on bank performance and bank failure, thereby elucidating the 
institutional background of the non-contagious attribute of the financial crisis that 
Yabushita and Inoue [1993] found. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief history of the 
Japanese banking sector and the policies of the financial authorities. Section 3 
describes basic characteristics of transaction relationships between the BOJ and 
private banks.  In section 4 and 5, we analyze the determinants of the transaction 
relationship and its implications.    Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Historical background 
The period from the 1920s and early 1930s is one of the major epochs in the 
financial history of Japan. Since the passing of the National Bank Act in 1872 and the 
Bank Act in 1890, the banking industry in Japan grew rapidly with many new 
entrants. In 1900, the number of ordinary banks reached a peak of 1890, when a shake 
out started (Figure 1). This shake out was accelerated by the impact of the boom 
during the First World War and its sudden end. Due to the high economic growth and 
                                                  
2  Following Ishii [1980], Shiratori [2003] argues that the BOJ’s selective stance was 
based on its policy of maintaining the value of the currency in preparation for the 
return to the gold standard.     loose monetary policy during the war, bank deposits increased sharply, which brought 
about a substantial change in the balance sheet of the banking sector (Figure2, 3).  
Before that, whereas the average ratio of equity to total liabilities was as high as 25%, 
it dropped to become 15 to 20% in the 1920s.    On the other hand, many banks lent out 
large amounts to the new industries that developed during the war boom, and a 
substantial part of these loans became non-performing after the war, due to the return 
of international competition and the depression.       
In addition, since the end of the 1910s, many banks expanded branch networks 
(Figure 2). The basic initial cause was the agreement among major banks in 1918 on 
the deposit interest rate.  As a result of the agreement, the spread between deposit 
interest rate and loan interest rate increased, which had the effect of stimulating 
competition among banks in their efforts to collect deposits (Tsurumi 1981, p.77; 
Okazaki 1993, p.304).  As indicated by the average number of branches, branch 
banking had been underdeveloped until then, which had limited interregional 
competition in the banking industry. On the other hand, in the 1920s, due to the 
expansion of branch banking, fierce interregional competition developed.   
The change in the balance sheet as well as the level of interregional competition 
led to the financial system becoming unstable in the 1920s. We measure the instability 
of the financial system by the interest rate spread between the risky debt and safe debt 
(Bernanke 1983; Stock and Watson; Mishkin 1991). Specifically, we use the interest the 
spread between the average bank loan rate and government bond rate (Shikano 1993; 
Okazaki 1993). Figure 4-a shows the long-term time series of the interest rate spread.  
Before the First World War, we can identify four spikes of interest rate spread, in 1900, 
1904, 1907 and 1913. They correspond to four episodes of bank panic (Akashi and 
Suzuki 1957; Nagaoka 1971; Oshima 1952). During these panics, the spread rose to 
exceed 4%.  Just after the War, the spread went up sharply, which reflects the bank 
panic that occurred in 1920 (Oshima 1952; Takeda 1983).  It is notable that in the 
1920s, the spread stayed around 4%, which is close to the level in the bank panics 
before the War, which suggests that the financial system was continuously unstable 
over this period. At the same time, it is also noteworthy that we cannot observe the 
individual impacts of the bank panics in 1922, 1923 and 1927 (Oshima 1955; 
Takahashi and Morigaki 1993; Takeda 1983). On the other hand, those panics are 
captured by the deposit data. Figure 4-b shows the semi-annual data of the difference 
between the growth rates of postal saving deposits and bank deposits. Here, bank 
deposits refer to the deposits in the all banks in Japan3. With respect to the 1920s, the 
                                                  
3  It includes the deposit of the Special Banks and the banks in Korea and Taiwan, and panics in 1920, 1922, 1923 and 1927 are captured by the spikes in the diagram.  In 
particular, it is confirmed that the panic in 1927 was serious and its impact continued 
for a long time. We will discuss below the reason why individual panics were not 
reflected in the interest rate spread.     
 Under the prolonged financial instability in the 1920s, shake out of banks 
proceeded rapidly. The number of ordinary banks, which was 1799 in 1922, had 
dropped to 424 by 1936. Out of the gross decrease of 1514 in this period4, 970 were due 
to mergers, and the other 544 were due to failures and voluntary liquidations (Figure 
1). One of the basic reasons why so many mergers took place was the merger promotion 
policy adopted by the Ministry of Finance. Since the 1890s, the Ministry of Finance 
had the intention of promoting bank mergers to stabilize the financial system, but no 
specific measures were taken until the 1920s. In 1920, through a revision to the Bank 
Act, the procedure for effecting bank mergers was made easier than it was for mergers 
between non-banking companies. In 1923, the Ministry of Finance issued a notification 
placing restrictions on the establishment of new branches, which spurred major banks 
to acquire smaller banks in order to expand branch networks. Finally, the Bank Law in 
1927 gave the government a powerful means of promoting bank mergers. That is, the 
Bank Law obliged an ordinary bank to have capital of not less than one million yen by 
1932, and many banks could not meet this criterion without merging with other banks 
(Goto 1970; Bank of Japan 1986, p.512; Okazaki 2002; Sawada and Okazaki 2004).  
As a result of bank mergers, branch banking grew substantially. 
The Ministry of Finance’s promotion of mergers can be regarded as a structural 
policy to stabilize the financial system by creating a concentrated market structure 
with branch banking. Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan actively played the role of LLR 
through giving “Special Loans” to private banks facing financial crises. Special Loans 
included loans based on the special laws passed to cope with emergencies (Act of Loss 
Compensation due to Earthquake Bill Discount passed in 1923, Law of the Bank of 
Japan Special Loan and Loss Compensation passed in 1927, and Law of the Loan to 
the Taiwan Bank passed in 1927), and other emergency loans provided at the 
discretion of the BOJ, skipping the ordinary due process and conditions that would 
normally have to be met (Ito 2003, p.171). In the 1920s, Special Loans as a proportion 
of the total domestic loans provided by the BOJ climbed to exceed 90% (Table 1).     
The lending pattern of the BOJ indicates that the BOJ actively intervened in 
                                                                                                                                                  
does not include the deposit of the BOJ. 
4  There were 139 new entries in this period, most of which were due to mergers into 
new banks. the financial market as the LLR in the 1920s.  The diagram in Figure 5 refers to the 
increase in domestic loans from the BOJ compared with the same quarter in the 
previous year.  As shown in Figure 5, the lending pattern of the BOJ was strikingly 
different before and after the First World War. Before the War, lending by the BOJ did 
not necessarily increase when bank panics occurred.    In particular, the lending by the 
BOJ seems to be negatively associated with the interest rate spread. In other words, 
the BOJ was not active as the LLR before the First World War. On the other hand, we 
observe sharp spikes in BOJ lending in 1920, 1922, 1923 and 1927. It has been 
assumed that active intervention by the BOJ is the basic reason why clear spikes in 
the interest rate spread cannot be found in the 1920s. In playing the role of LLR, the 
BOJ tended to favor those banks with which it already had transaction relationships 
when it came to providing Special Loans (Ishii 1980). Table 2 indicates the composition 
of Special Loans based on the Law of the Bank of Japan Special Loan and Loss 
Compensation. As shown here, the proportion of banks which had already had 
transaction relationships was as high as 95.0%.     
      
1.  Transactions between the BOJ and private banks 
The Bank of Japan started transactions with private banks just after its 
establishment in 1882 (The Bank of Japan 1982, p.328).  The transactions included 
current deposits, current account transfers, overdrafts accounts, correspondent 
accounts, discounts and loans.    Table 1 summarizes the level of BOJ transactions with 
private banks.  Until the end of the nineteenth century, the major instrument the 
BOJ used to provide credit to private banks was the time loan, and after that 
discounting became dominant.    This was basically because the stamp tax rate on bills 
became lower than it was for deeds, due to the revision of the Stamp Act in 1899 (Ishii 
1999, p.194; Sugiyama and Kawakami 1965).  Whereas correspondent accounts 
increased to 240 in 1900, they declined after that because their function was replaced 
by current account transfers (The Bank of Japan 1913a).  Consequently, in the 1920s 
and 1930s, discounts and current deposits were the major tools used by the BOJ in its 
transactions with private banks.   
The BOJ had internal rules prescribing the procedure that had to be followed 
when opening a transaction with a private bank.  First, the private bank which 
wished to open a transaction relationship with the BOJ filed an application to the 
Business Bureau of the headquarters of the BOJ or a branch of the BOJ. If the 
Business Bureau or the branch judged that the applicant bank was eligible, it sent the 
application to the Governor of the BOJ. Then the Examination Department of the headquarters examined the application, and if the Examination Department judged 
that the applicant bank was eligible, the Governor proposed the opening of transaction 
at the Director Meeting5. .     
First, we identify the ordinary banks which had transaction relationships with 
the BOJ. The basic data can be obtained from the tables “Change in the 
Correspondents”, which Ishii[1980] used6. The information in these tables includes the 
date on which each headquarters or branch of the BOJ opened and closed a transaction 
relationship with the headquarters or branch of a bank by kind of transaction, namely, 
current deposit, discount etc. Data from September 1923, with respect to the 
headquarters of the BOJ, and data from January 1909, with respect to the BOJ’s 
branches, are available. As to the relationships which started before September 1923 
or January 1909, the dates of the starts are recorded as “before September 1923” or 
“before January 1909.”  The data on the headquarters are limited because the 
documents were lost in the fire that followed the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923.  
Using this source, we compiled a comprehensive database of the BOJ’s transaction 
relationships from 1923 to 1942. 
Then we matched this database with the comprehensive database of ordinary 
banks from 1925 to 1936.    The latter database was compiled from various issues of the 
Yearbook of the Bank Bureau issued by the Ministry of Finance. Table 2 shows the 
number of ordinary banks which had transaction relationships with the BOJ. The 
number declined sharply from 253 in 1925 to 148 in 1932, and after that the downward 
trend was less marked. While this movement corresponds to the decline in the total 
number of ordinary banks, as the latter trend was sharper, the proportion of the 
ordinary banks which had transaction relationships with the BOJ went up from 16.5% 
in 1925 to 31.4% in 1936, but still they were the minority in terms of the number 
(Imuta[1980] and Ishii[1980]). On the other hand, in terms of the amounts of deposits 
and loans, the BOJ correspondent banks had a large share. Their share of the total 
deposits and loans of the ordinary banks was higher than 90% in 1935 (Table 3).   
Next, the ordinary banks are classified according to a couple of criteria into 
several groups to compare the ratios of BOJ correspondents between the groups. Table 
4 shows the results where we classify banks by deposit scale. With respect to the years 
1925, 1930 and 1935, we find a clear positive correlation between deposit scale and the 
                                                  
5  The Bank of Japan, Nippon Ginko Enkakushi (History of Bank of Japan), series 
1-volume 2, p.403, series 2-volume 3, p.1, pp.524-525. Nippon Ginko Enkakushi is an 
unpublished series of volumes on the BOJ History edited by the BOJ.   
6  Nippon Ginko Enkakushi (History of Bank of Japan), op cit., series2-volume 3 and 
series 3-volume 3. ratio of BOJ correspondents. For example, in 1925, whereas all of the ordinary banks 
whose deposits were not smaller than 100 million yen had transaction relationships 
with the BOJ, only 2.3% of banks whose deposits were less than one million yen, even 
though they represented more than 50% of the banks, had transaction relationships 
with the BOJ. The shares of the BOJ correspondents in each deposit scale group did 
not change substantially over time. This implies that the rise of the share of the BOJ 
correspondents in Table 2 basically reflects the change in the distribution of bank scale 
over the ten-year period.   
Table 5 shows the result where we classify the banks by the area in which they 
were located, namely urban or non-urban areas. The urban area includes the seven 
prefectures, Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kanagawa, Aichi, Hyogo and Fukuoka. In this case, 
the proportion of BOJ correspondents was not substantially different between the two 
areas. However, if we add the criterion of bank scale taking into account the 
discrepancy in the scale distribution between the two areas, we find some differences 
(Table 6). With respect to the small banks whose total deposits came to less than five 
million yen, the proportion of BOJ correspondents was substantially higher in 
non-urban areas.  This fact suggests that the BOJ used different standards when 
deciding which banks they were prepared to transact with.  Finally, we examine the 
difference in the proportion of BOJ correspondents between the prefectures where the 
headquarters or branches of the BOJ were located and the prefectures where they 
were not, as suggested by Imuta [1980].  At the end of 1925, in addition to the 
headquarters in Tokyo, the BOJ had fifteen branches in fourteen prefectures, namely, 
Osaka, Fukuoka, Aichi, Hokkaido, Kyoto, Fukushima, Hiroshima, Ishikawa, Niigata, 
Nagano, Kumamoto, Akita, Shimane and Okayama7. After that, BOJ branches were 
established in Hyogo prefecture in 1927, and in Ehime prefecture in 1932 (The Bank of 
Japan[1986]).    We find that the proportion of BOJ correspondents was much higher in 
prefectures with BOJ headquarters or branches (Table 7). To control for the difference 
in the scale distribution, classification by deposit scale is added in Table 8. It is 
confirmed that the proportion of BOJ correspondents was higher in the prefectures 
with BOJ headquarters or branches, with respect to each class of deposit scale.   
 
4. How did the BOJ select transaction counterparts ?   
Using the database of BOJ correspondents, we can identify the name of the 
ordinary banks which opened and closed transaction relationships with the BOJ as 
well as the year these events took place. The numbers of openings and closings in each 
                                                  
7  In Hokkaido, the BOJ had two branches in the cities of Otaru and Hakodate. year from 1926 to 1936 are shown in Table 9. Eighteen ordinary banks opened 
transaction relationships with the BOJ during this period, while 162 ordinary banks 
closed them.  For 123 banks of these 162 banks, the close year and the year they 
exited from the banking industry were the same. We can infer that they closed 
transaction relationships with the BOJ as a result of their exits. The other 39 banks 
continued business at least until the end of the next year following the close.  We 
regard these 39 cases as the closing of transactions with the BOJ in a narrow sense, 
namely closing of transactions not due to exits. The fact that so many closings occurred 
is worth noting in itself.    Whereas the emergency loans by the BOJ were concentrated 
on the banks which had transaction relationships with BOJ, as Ishii[1980] stressed, a 
bank could not necessarily survive, even if it had a transaction relationship with the 
BOJ.  
As mentioned in section 1, the documents on the individual openings and closings 
of transaction relationships are held at the BOJ archives. In particular, the documents 
on the openings contain a rich store of information, as the openings had to be approved 
at a director’s meeting. From these documents we can see why the private banks 
wanted to have transaction relationships with the BOJ, and how the BOJ screened the 
applications from the private banks. The private banks wanted to have transactions 
with the BOJ basically so that they could raise and apply funds flexibly.  By 
borrowing funds from the BOJ in the case of a liquidity shortage, they could cope with 
the volatility in the financial market including seasonality, which in turn enabled them 
to expand the opportunities for fund application.   
While the BOJ recognized the situation the private banks were in, it paid 
attention to the following conditions when approving their applications. The first one 
was the soundness of the bank’s financial condition in terms of profitability and the 
riskiness of the portfolio.  Second, and related to the first point, the BOJ took into 
account the composition of the directors and their personal financial status. The third 
condition was the bank’s scale and position in the local financial market. The BOJ 
placed considerable emphasis on whether the bank was one of the major banks in the 
area, and if it contributed to financing local industries. Finally, the BOJ took into 
account whether there were alternatives for these banks for raising fund for 
transactions apart from the BOJ.   
Next, we quantitatively examine how those conditions affected the choice of 
transaction counterparts by the BOJ. Taking into account the above observations, we 
assume the following function for the BOJ when choosing a counterpart.   




Prob(BOJTit=1)=F[β’ （Xit-1,+Zit-1） ]                                          ( 1 )  
           
BOJTit is a dummy variable which equals 1 if bank i had a transaction relationship 
with the BOJ in year t, and 0, otherwise. Xit is a vector of the attributes of the bank i in 
year t, and Zit is a vector of the attributes of the area where bank i was located, in year 
t.    As the attributes of a bank, we focus on scale, profitability, riskiness of the portfolio 
and liquidity, referring to the above case studies.  Scale is measured by the log value 
of the asset (LNASSET).  In addition to this, we use the ranking of the assets in the 
prefecture in each year, normalized by the number of ordinary banks in the prefecture 
(ASSETRANK).  Profitability is measured by the return on asset (ROA).  Riskiness 
of the portfolio is measured by the loan deposit ratio (LDR), while liquidity is measured 
by the reserve ratio (RESERVE).  We compute RESERVE by (cash+deposit to other 
banks)/deposit. As the variable on the attributes of the area, we use URBAN, which is 
a dummy variable which equals 1 if the prefecture where the headquarters of the bank 
was one of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo and Fukuoka, the 
prefectures of the seven largest cities, and 0, otherwise.  Because the BOJ gave 
priority to those banks which had difficulty accessing the central financial market, as 
we have seen, we expect that the coefficient of URBAN will be negative.    Also, we use 
a dummy variable BOJBRANCH, which equals 1 if there was a branch of the BOJ in 
the prefecture where the headquarters of the bank was located, and 0, otherwise.  As 
Imuta[1980] pointed out, we anticipated that the probability of a bank forming a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ was higher for those banks which had their 
headquarters in the prefectures where a branch of the BOJ was located.  Then the 
baseline equation to be estimated is,  
 
Prob(BOJTit=1)=F(β 0+β 1LNASSETit-1+β 2ASSETRANK it-1+β 3ROAit-1+β 4LDRit-1+β 5RESERVE it-1 
+β 6URBAN it-1+β 7BOJBRANCHit-1)                                                                (2) 
 
First, we estimate equation (2), using the samples of all the ordinary banks which 
existed in the period from 1926 to 1936.  As there were many exits as well as entries 
of banks in this period, the dataset is an unbalanced panel made up of 8296 
observations. The observations where BOJT=1 are 1863.    The result is shown in Table 10.    In column (a), the coefficients of the scale variables, LNASSET and ASSETRANK 
have expected signs and are statistically significant. That is, not only the absolute 
scale of an asset but also its relative rank in the prefecture are positively associated 
with the probability of forming a transaction relationship with the BOJ.  The 
coefficient of ROA is positive and statistically significant, as expected.  On the other 
hand, the coefficient of LDR is positive and significant.  In other words, riskiness of 
the portfolio was positively associated with the probability of becoming a 
correspondent of the BOJ, which is contrary to our expectations based on the case 
studies.   
This result might reflect the reverse causality that those banks which had 
transaction relationships with the BOJ could adopt and implement aggressive fund 
application policies.    Although we use variables with a one-year lag as the regressors, 
if the regressors have serial correlations, it is possible that they correlate with the 
error term.  We will discuss this issue later.  Concerning the variables related to the 
aerial attributes, the coefficient of URBAN is negative and significant, while the 
coefficient of BOJBRANCH is positive and significant.  As we expected, the 
probability of becoming a correspondent of the BOJ was lower for those banks in urban 
areas, as these banks had good access to the central financial market, and it was 
higher for the banks in the prefectures where BOJ’s branches were located.     
     In column (b) we add the interaction term of LNASSET and URBAN to see the 
difference of the scale effects between urban areas and other areas. The coefficient of 
the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, which implies that the 
effect of the scale on the probability of forming a transaction relationship with the BOJ 
was higher in urban areas.    The coefficient of URBAN is still negative and significant. 
As a result, for smaller banks, the probability of becoming a BOJ transaction 
counterpart was higher if they were located in a non-urban area, whereas for larger 
banks it was higher if they were located in an urban area.  The threshold asset level 
where the sign of the net effect of being located in the urban area changes is 37.59 
million yen. This scale is between 48th and 49th largest out of 1420 ordinary banks in 
1926, and between 43rd and 44th largest out of 423 ordinary banks in 1936.  These 
results are consistent with the observation in Table 6.     
          So far, we have focused on the state of transaction relationships between the BOJ 
and an ordinary bank in each year. Alternatively, we can focus on the number of 
openings and closings of transaction relationships in each year.  These analyses are 
useful to deal with the possible endogeneity problem in the results reported in Table 10.   
First, we analyze the determinants of opening transaction relationships between the BOJ and ordinary banks. For that purpose, we take the 6413 bank-years, whose BOJT 
in the previous year is 0, as the samples. Out of them, there were 18 events of opening 
transaction relationships.  Then, we make a dummy variable BOJTOit, which equals 
one if bank i opened a transaction relationship with the BOJ in year t, and 0, otherwise, 
and regress it to the same independent variables as the baseline regression in Table 10, 
using a logit model. In column (c), the coefficient of LNASSET is positive and 
statistically significant. Also, the coefficient of ASSSETRASNK is negative, though the 
statistical significance is not high. Those banks whose asset scales were large had a 
higher probability of opening a transaction relationship with the BOJ.    The coefficient 
of ROA is negative, but the statistical significance is low.  It is notable that the 
coefficient of LDR is negative and statistically significant, unlike the result in Table 10.   
In the literature on the Japanese financial system covering this period, LDR has been 
regarded as an index showing the unsoundness of a bank’s assets (Imuta 2002, 
pp.65-83; Teranishi 1982, pp.311-327). This result is consistent with the observation of 
the case studies in the previous section.       
     Next we analyze the determinants of closing transaction relationships between 
the BOJ and ordinary banks.  In this case, we focus on the 1883 bank-year, whose 
BOJT was 1 in the previous year. Out of them, 39 banks closed transactions with the 
BOJ due to reasons other than exit. We make a dummy variable BOJTCit, which 
equals 1 if a bank i closed a transaction relationship with the BOJ in year t, and 0, 
otherwise, and regress it to the same independent variables as in Table 11. The result 
is reported in Table 12.  The coefficient of LNASSET is negative and statistically 
significant, which implies that there was a higher probability of small banks closing a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ.  The coefficient of ROA is negative and 
statistically  significant.  Also,  the  coefficient of RESERVE is negative and statistically 
significant.  The results concerning profitability and liquidity are significant because 
this implies that the BOJ closed transaction relationships with those correspondents 
whose profitability declined and whose portfolio became risky, and did not persevere in 
trying to rescue them by maintaining the transac t i o n   r e l a t i o n s h i p .                  
   
5. Effects of transactions between the BOJ and private banks 
     As we have seen, by opening transaction relationships with the BOJ, private 
banks hoped to increase the flexibility of fund application, and the BOJ chose them 
selectively based on specific criteria including scale, profitability and riskiness of the 
portfolio. Then, the next question is how transaction relationships with the BOJ 
actually affected the performance of the private banks and thereby the performance of the financial system itself. We hypothesize that a transaction with the BOJ reduced 
the liquidity risk for a bank, which enabled it to apply funds more aggressively than 
otherwise. And, as a result, they should have been able to earn higher profits. In this 
section, we examine this hypothesis. 
    For this purpose, it is essential to deal with the endogeneity of transaction 
relationships between the BOJ and private banks. We can use equation (1) in the 
previous section to do this. That is, we estimate the following treatment effect model 
(Green 2000, p.933). 
 
Пit=γ’Wit+δBOJTit+ei t                                                                      (3) 
where 
BOJTit=1, if BOJTit*>0, and 0, otherwise     
BOJTit*=β’（Xit-1+Zit-1）+uit 
 
Пit is a performance measure of bank i in year t.    Wit is a vector of exogenous variables 
affected on Пit. BOJBRANCH is an exogenous variable which is included in equation 
(1), but not in equation (3). We hypothesize that a transaction relationship with the 
BOJ enabled a bank to apply funds more aggressively, and thereby enhanced 
profitability.  In order to examine this hypothesis, we first look at the effect of BOJT 
on the variables in the bank’s portfolio, namely ratios of loans to total assets (LOAN) 
and the ratio of securities to total assets (SECURITIES). In the regression, we control 
for the log value of asset (LNASSET), the number of branches (BRANCH), prefecture 
dummies, and year dummies. BRANCH is taken from the various issues of the 
Yearbook of the Bank Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. The results are reported in 
Table 13.  As we expected, the coefficients of BOJT are positive and statistically 
significant for both LOAN and SECURITIES, which implies that a transaction 
relationship with the BOJ led to a bank raising the proportion of interest earning 
assets.   
Next we use ROA as  П. In the literature on banking, scale, portfolio and market 
competition are considered to be the basic determinants of profitability. By LNASSET 
and BRANCH, we capture the scale factor. Portfolio is captured by LOAN, 
SECURITIES and RESERVE.  In order to measure the degree of competition, we 
make a variable C3. C3 refers to the concentration ratio in terms of the number of 
headquarters and branches in each prefecture in each year, namely, (number of 
branches of the three largest banks in each prefecture in terms of branch number+3)/(number of headquarters and branches of all the banks in each prefecture)8. 
Branches are counted in the prefectures where those branches themselves were located, 
and not in the prefectures where their headquarters were located.  The location data 
on branches are obtained from various issues of the Handbook of Banks (Ginko Soran) 
edited by the Bank Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (Okazaki, Sawada and 
Yokoyama 2003).  In addition, we control for the prefecture specific effects and year 
specific effects which are not captured by those basic variables, using prefecture 
dummies and year dummies.   
Estimation results are reported in Table 13. In order to test the hypothesis that 
the effect of BOJT on ROA is the result of an aggressive portfolio management policy, 
we estimate the equation which does not include LOAN, SECURITIES and RESERVE 
(column (c)) as well as that which includes these variables (column (d)). In column (c) 
the coefficient of BOJT is positive and statistically significant, which implies that a 
positive effect of a transaction relationship with the BOJ on the profitability is 
confirmed, even after controlling for the endogeneity of BOJT. On the other hand the 
coefficient of BOJT is not significant in column (d), which implies that the positive 
effect of a transaction with the BOJ was basically through its effect on the bank’s 
portfolio.    
Finally we explore the effect of a transaction relationship with the BOJ on a 
bank’s exit. As described in section 2, many banks exited over the period from the 
1920s to the 1930s as a result of mergers and failures. And it has been found that bank 
failures in this period tended to eliminate banks with poor performance, thereby 
enhancing the efficiency of the banking industry (Yabushita and Inoue 1993; Okazaki 
2002; Okazaki, Sawada and Yokoyama 2005). We hypothesize that this property of the 
failures was related to the role of the BOJ. More specifically, through supplying funds 
selectively to those banks which were facing a liquidity shortage but not insolvent, the 
BOJ supported the efficiency enhancing effect of the selection of banks by the market.  
In order to examine this hypothesis, we estimate the following multinomial logit model 
for bank exit.   
    
Prob(EXITit=j)=G[γ’(Ｖit-1) ] ,   j = 0 ,   1 ,   2                                            ( 4 )  
 
j=0, if a bank survived in year t. j=1, if a bank was merged in year t, and j=2, if a bank 
failed in year t. Ｖit is a vector of exogenous variables on bank i in year t.  The 
                                                  
8  “3” in the numerator refers to the number of the headquarters of the three largest 
banks. The concentration ratio in terms of deposit or asset is not available. equation to be estimated is 
 
Prob(EXITit=j)=γ0+γ1LNASSETit-1+γ2BRANCH it-1+γ3ROA it-1+γ4LDR it-1 
+γ5EQUITY it-1+γ6RESERVE it-1+γ7AGE it-1+γ8URBAN it-1+γ9QUAKE it-1 
+γ10 FORM +γ11 CRITERION+γ12BOJT it-1＋γ13BOJT it-1*ROA it-1 
＋γ14BOJT it-1*LDR it-1＋γ15BOJT it-1*EQUITY it-1 
＋γ16BOJT it-1*RESERVE it-1                                           ( 5 )  
 
EQUITY is the ratio of equity to total assets, and QUAKE is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the prefecture where a bank was located is Tokyo or Kanagawa, and which 
were seriously damaged by the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923.    FORM is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the bank was a joint-stock company, and 0, otherwise.  
CRITERION is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the bank’s capital was smaller 
than the lower limit of the capital prescribed under Bank Law.  BOJT*ROA, 
BOJT*LDR, BOJT*EQUITY and BOJT*RESERVE are the interaction terms between 
BOJT and the variables of the bank’s financial condition, ROA, LDR, EQUITY and 
RESERVE.   
The estimation results are shown in Table 14.  In column (a), we estimated 
equation (5), excluding the interaction terms. ROA is negatively associated with failure, 
which confirms the results of Yabushita and Inoue [1993] and Okazaki[2002].  The 
coefficient of BOJT is negative, but not statistically significant, which implies that a 
transaction with the BOJ did not have the effect of increasing the overall survivability 
of its transaction counterparts. Column (b) is the same equation but where we limit the 
samples to those from 1926 to 1931, when the financial system was unstable, but the 
result is basically the same. In column (c) and (d), we show the estimation results of 
equation (5) including the interaction terms. If we use all of the sample period, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms are not statistically significant. On the other hand, 
where we limit the samples to those from 1926 to 1931, the coefficient of BOJT*ROA is 
negative and statistically significant, and the coefficient of BOJT*LDR is positive and 
statistically significant with respect to the failure. BOJT is not significant here, either. 
These results imply that whereas a transaction with the BOJ did not have the effect of 
increasing the overall survivability of transaction counterparts, it amplified the effect 
of ROA and LDR. In other word, if banks had a transaction relationship with the BOJ, 
the survivability of good banks increased. In this sense, transaction relationships with 
the  BOJ  enhanced  the  efficacy  of  the  selection  of  banks  by  the  market.                                  
 6. Concluding remarks 
     Under the unstable financial system that existed in the 1920s, the BOJ actively 
intervened in the market as the LLR, which is reflected in the spikes in BOJ lending 
during the periods of bank panics. In providing an LLR loan, the BOJ adopted the 
policy of favoring banks which already had a transaction relationship with the BOJ. 
On the other hand, the BOJ selected transaction counterparts based on the   
applications made by private banks.  From the case studies on the opening of 
transaction relationships, we found that the BOJ used the following criteria in 
selecting counterparts, namely, (a) financial condition of the bank (profitability and 
soundness of the portfolio), (b) composition of the directors and large shareholders, and 
their private assets, (c) scale of the bank and its position in the local financial market, 
(d) availability of funds other than BOJ loans. This finding is basically confirmed by 
the econometric analysis of the determinants of the transaction relationship. That is, 
the probability of having a transaction relationship with the BOJ was high for those 
banks whose scale was large, whose scale ranking in the prefecture was high, and 
which was located in a non-urban area.    Also, the probability of opening a transaction 
relationship with the BOJ was high for those banks whose scale was large and whose 
scale ranking in the prefecture was high, and it was low for banks whose portfolios 
were risky.   At the same time, for banks whose ROA was low and which were located 
in urban areas, the probability of a transaction relationship with the BOJ being closed 
was high. It is noteworthy that banks whose profitability was low could not maintain a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ, which implies that the relationship did not 
always guarantee the bank’s survival. 
     Based on the findings about the determinants of the transaction relationship 
with the BOJ, we explored the effects of the relationship on the bank performance, 
using the treatment effect model.    It was found that the transaction relationship with 
the BOJ enabled a bank to adopt an aggressive portfolio management policy, and 
thereby had a positive impact on profitability. Finally, we analyzed how the 
transaction relationship affected bank failure. It was found that the relationship had 
no significant overall effect on a bank’s survivability, but that in the period when the 
financial system was especially unstable, it enhances the effect of high ROA and low 
LDR on survivability of banks. It implies that the BOJ was not only selective in 
forming transaction relationships with private banks, but it was also selective in 
bailing out its transaction counterparts. In other words, the BOJ rescued only those 
counterparts which were profitable and prudent, and also it was only in the period 
when the financial system was especially unstable. This suggests that through concentrating its LLR lending on its transaction counterparts, the BOJ could 
successfully bail out illiquid but solvent banks, and thereby avoided the moral hazard 
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Interest rate spread (bank loan-government
bond, left scale)
Growth rate of domestic loans by the BOJ
(right scale)
%/year %/year
Source: Toyo Keizai Shinposha [1927]; The Ministry of Finance, Kin'yu Jiko
Sankosho (Handbook of Financial Issues), various issues
Figure4 Interest rate spread and domestic loans of the BOJTable1 Scale of the BOJ's transaction with private banks
thousand yen, number of accounts
Loan Overdrawn of




1882 477 0 0 253 ･･･
1885 2,586 32 1,315 324 ･･･
1890 13,540 2,284 12,578 2,403 ･･･
1895 24,933 4,395 26,183 1,601 126
1900 7,683 3,764 80,195 2,007 240
1905 9,646 403 28,152 10,824 176
1910 6,900 2,589 29,323 7,363 155
1915 1,950 837 26,786 8,979 153
1920 1,700 1,611 155,296 49,942 116
1925 0 9,267 306,606 54,513 72
1930 0 0 103,039 112,625 42
1935 0 570 162,913 112,568 ･･･
1940 0 173 386,479 228,725 ･･･
Source: Bank of Japan [1986]; Semiannual Report of the Bank of Japan; Year Book of the Bank Bureau. Table2 Numer of ordinary banks with transaction relationship with the BOJ
Total  BOJ correspondent banksShare(%)
1925 1,536 253 16.5
1926 1,420 246 17.3
1927 1,283 227 17.7
1928 1,031 198 19.2
1929 881 180 20.4
1930 782 173 22.1
1931 683 167 24.5
1932 538 148 27.5
1933 516 143 27.7
1934 484 141 29.1
1935 466 138 29.6
1936 424 133 31.4
Source: With respect to the number of correspondent banks, see the text.
           The total number is from the Year Book of Bank Bureau. Table3 Share of the BOJ correspondent banks in terms of deposit and loan
Deposit Loan
BOJ correspondent banks 1925 6,992 7,315
(million yen) 1930 7,576 5,799
1935 9,105 5,902
Total 1925 8,727 8,843
(million yen) 1930 8,737 6,815
1935 9,950 6,192
Share 1925 80.1 82.7
(%) 1930 86.7 85.1
1935 91.5 95.3
Source: See Table 3.Table 4 Share of the BOJ correspondent banks in terms of number by deposit scale 
Total BOJ correspondent banksShare(%)
1925 Not less than 100 million yen 16 16 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 107 93 86.9
Not less than 5 million yen 90 46 51.1
Not less than 1million yen 465 78 16.8
Less than 1million yen 858 20 2.3
1930 Not less than 100 million yen 14 14 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 94 78 83.0
Not less than 5 million yen 57 26 45.6
Not less than 1million yen 270 45 16.7
Less than 1million yen 347 10 2.9
1935 Not less than 100 million yen 15 15 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 83 67 80.7
Not less than 5 million yen 41 24 58.5
Not less than 1million yen 188 28 14.9
Less than 1million yen 139 4 2.9
Source: See Table 2.Table5 Share of the BOJ corespondent banks by area
Total BOJ correspondent banksShare (%)
1925 Urban 478 83 17.4
Non-urban 1,058 170 16.1
1930 Urban 240 58 24.2
Non-urban 542 115 21.2
1935 Urban 149 47 31.5
Non-urban 317 91 28.7
Source: See Table2.
Note: Urban area refers to the seven prefectures, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo and Fukuoka. Table 6 Share of the BOJ correspondent banks by are and deposit scale
Total BOJ correspondent banks Share (%)
1925 Urban Not less than 100 million yen 16 16 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 36 31 86.1
Not less than 5 million yen 30 15 50.0
Not less than 1million yen 148 19 12.8
Less than 1million yen 248 2 0.8
Non-urban Not less than 100 million yen 0 0 ･･･
Not less than 10 million yen 72 62 86.1
Not less than 5 million yen 59 31 52.5
Not less than 1million yen 317 59 18.6
Less than 1million yen 450 18 4.0
1930 Urban Not less than 100 million yen 14 14 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 16 15 93.8
Not less than 5 million yen 27 16 59.3
Not less than 1million yen 86 11 12.8
Less than 1million yen 97 2 2.1
Non-urban Not less than 100 million yen 0 0 ･･･
Not less than 10 million yen 78 63 80.8
Not less than 5 million yen 30 10 33.3
Not less than 1million yen 184 34 18.5
Less than 1million yen 250 8 3.2
1935 Urban Not less than 100 million yen 13 13 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 15 14 93.3
Not less than 5 million yen 22 13 59.1
Not less than 1million yen 66 6 9.1
Less than 1million yen 33 1 3.0
Non-urban Not less than 100 million yen 22 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 68 53 77.9
Not less than 5 million yen 19 11 57.9
Not less than 1million yen 122 22 18.0
Less than 1million yen 105 3 2.9
Source: See Table 2.Table 7 Share of the BOJ correspondent banks by proximity to the BOJ headquarters or a branch
Total BOJ correrspondent banks Share (%)
1925 With the BOJ headquarters or a branch  599 139 23.2
Without the BOJ headquarters or a branch 937 114 12.2
1930 With the BOJ headquarters or a branch  369 101 27.4
Without the BOJ headquarters or a branch 413 72 17.4
1935 With the BOJ headquarters or a branch  230 83 36.1
Without the BOJ headquarters or a branch 236 55 23.3
Source: See Table 2.Table 8 Share of the BOJ corrspondent banks by deposit scale and proximity to the BOJ headquarters or a branch 
Total BOJ correrspondent banksShare (%)
1925 With the BOJ headquarters or a branch  Not less than 100 million yen 16 16 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 44 42 95.5
Not less than 5 million yen 37 24 64.9
Not less than 1million yen 170 45 26.5
Less than 1million yen 332 12 3.6
Without the BOJ headquarters or a branchNot less than 100 million yen 0 0 ･･･
Not less than 10 million yen 64 51 79.7
Not less than 5 million yen 42 22 52.4
Not less than 1million yen 295 33 11.2
Less than 1million yen 526 8 1.5
1930 With the BOJ headquarters or a branch  Not less than 100 million yen 14 14 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 34 33 97.1
Not less than 5 million yen 26 18 69.2
Not less than 1million yen 121 28 23.1
Less than 1million yen 174 8 4.6
Without the BOJ headquarters or a branchNot less than 100 million yen 0 0 ･･･
Not less than 10 million yen 60 45 75.0
Not less than 5 million yen 31 8 25.8
Not less than 1million yen 149 17 11.4
Less than 1million yen 173 2 1.2
1935 With the BOJ headquarters or a branch  Not less than 100 million yen 15 15 100.0
Not less than 10 million yen 32 29 90.6
Not less than 5 million yen 25 18 72.0
Not less than 1million yen 88 18 20.5
Less than 1million yen 70 3 4.3
Without the BOJ headquarters or a branchNot less than 100 million yen 0 0 ･･･
Not less than 10 million yen 51 38 74.5
Not less than 5 million yen 16 6 37.5
Not less than 1million yen 100 10 10.0
Less than 1million yen 69 1 1.4
Source: See Table 2.Table 9 Number of openings and closures of transaction relationships with the BOJ
Openings Closures
Survive Exit
Total 18 162 38 124
1926 21 1 4 7
1927 32 5 5 2 0
1928 03 6 1 0 2 6
1929 11 7 3 1 4
1930 21 1 1 1 0
1931 29 2 7
1932 12 4 1 2 1 2
1933 18 1 7
1934 47 0 7
1935 05 0 5
1936 29 0 9
Source: See the text.Table10 Determinants of transaction relationships with the BOJ
Dependent variable: BOJT （ａ) (b)
Const. -33.758 (-30.379) *** -32.298 (-27.270) ***
LNASSETt-1 2.135 (30.409) *** 2.042 (27.049) ***
ASSETRANKt-1 -0.740 (-3.468) *** -0.740 (-3.480) ***
BRANCHt-1 -0.057 (-10.789) *** -0.058 (-9.403) ***
ROAt-1 10.082 (6.168) *** 9.792 (5.989) ***
LDRt-1 0.004 (2.390) ** 0.004 (2.488) **
RESERVEt-1 -0.426 (-1.421) -0.338 (-1.135)
URBANt-1 -1.386 (-12.723) *** -8.373 (-4.692) ***
BOJBRANCHt-1 1.753 (17.567) *** 1.704 (17.189) ***
LNASSETt-1*URBANt-1 0.451 (3.925) ***
R
2 0.556 0.557
Log likelihood -2123.82 -2114.89
Obs. 8296 8296
Positive obs. 1863 1863
Note: t-values in parentheses
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level
        *  Statistically significant at 10％ levelTable 11 Determinants of openings of transaction relationships with the BOJ
Dependent variable：BOJTO
Const. -17.334 (-2.487) **













Note: t-values in parentheses
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level
        *  Statistically significant at 10％ levelTable 12 Determinants of closures of transaction relationships with the BOJ
Dependent variable：BOJTC
Const. 10.456 (2.569) **
LNASSETt-1 -0.812 (-3.271) ***
ASSETRANKt-1 0.151 (0.149)
BRANCHt-1 0.025 (1.796) *
ROAt-1 -19.794 (-1.921) *
LDRt-1 0.006 (0.111)
RESERVEt-1 -10.906 (-3.595) ***







Note: t-values in parentheses
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level
        *  Statistically significant at 10％ levelTable 13 Effect of a transaction relationship with the BOJ on a bank's portfolio (treatment effect model)
Dependent variable: LOAN Dependent variable: SECURITIES
Const. 1.688 7.92 *** -0.107 -1.57
LNASSET -0.062 -4.68 *** 0.011 2.47 **
BRANCH -0.003 -2.17 ** -0.002 -4.63 ***
BOJT 0.272 3.90 *** 0.168 7.51 ***
Dependent variable: BOJT Dependent variable: BOJT
Const. -11.378 -39.05 *** -11.378 -39.05 ***
BOJBRANCH 0.679 16.31 *** 0.679 16.31 ***
LNASSET 0.714 37.96 *** 0.714 37.96 ***
ASSETRANK -0.001 -0.30 -0.001 -0.30
URBAN -0.513 -10.16 *** -0.513 -10.16 ***
Obs. 9913 9913
Wald chi2(60) 408.31 614.54
Note: LOAN regression and SECURITIES regression include prefecture dummies and
        year dummies, but not reported.Table 14 Effect of a transaction relationship with the BOJ on a bank's profitability (treatment effect model)
Dependent variable: ROA Dependent variable: ROA
Const. 0.083 12.39 *** 0.089 13.11 ***
LNASSET -0.004 -9.95 *** -0.004 -10.36 ***
BRANCH -0.001 -1.41 -0.001 -1.95 *
LOAN 0.004 13.73 ***
SECURITIES 0.005 5.49 ***
RESERVE 0.000 -1.14
CON3 -0.008 -1.21 -0.006 -0.97
BOJT 0.002 0.83 0.004 1.78 *
Dependent variable: BOJT Dependent variable: BOJT
Const. -11.378 -39.05 *** -11.378 -39.05 ***
BOJBRANCH 0.679 16.31 *** 0.679 16.31 ***
LNASSET 0.714 37.96 *** 0.714 37.96 ***
ASSETRANK -0.001 -0.30 -0.001 -0.30
URBAN -0.513 -10.16 *** -0.513 -10.16 ***
Obs. 9913 9913
Wald chi2(60) 2111.81 1819.45
Note: LOAN regression and SECURITIES regression include prefecture dummies and
        year dummies, but not reported.Table 15 Effect of transaction relationships with the BOJ on bank exits
A.1926-1936
Failure Merger Failure Merger
Const. 4.693 (4.543) *** 0.860 (1.036) 4.756 (4.606) *** 0.814 (0.978)
LNASSET -0.583 (-8.553) *** -0.247 (-4.557) *** -0.584 (-8.570) *** -0.244 (-4.482) ***
BRANCH 0.201 (1.877) * 0.003 (0.436) 0.023 (2.090) ** 0.003 (0.398)
ROA -15.841 (-7.890) *** -0.063 (-0.055) -16.693 (-7.992) *** 0.245 (0.212)
LDR 0.000 (-0.241) 0.001 (0.212) -0.001 (-0.382) 0.001 (0.411)
RESERVE -0.010 (-1.032) -0.013 (-0.339) -0.009 (-0.954) -0.014 (-0.354)
EQUITY 2.189 (8.063) *** -0.828 (-3.126) *** 2.125 (7.689) *** -0.863 (-3.153) ***
AGE 0.011 (2.618) *** 0.007 (2.028) ** 0.011 (2.667) *** 0.006 (1.948) *
FORM -0.481 (-2.221) ** 0.093 (0.492) -0.494 (-2.280) ** 0.090 (0.473)
CRITERION 0.103 (0.660) 0.446 (3.830) *** 0.110 (0.700) 0.455 (3.896) ***
URBAN -0.041 (-0.303) -0.145 (-1.505) -0.056 (-0.415) -0.141 (-1.468)
QUAKE 0.970 (5.417) *** -0.121 (-0.667) 0.959 (5.345) *** -0.104 (-0.576)
BOJT -0.167 (-0.717) -0.019 (-0.133) -0.607 (-1.220) -0.033 (-0.108)
BOJT*ROA 3.407 (0.459) -10.340 (-1.348)
BOJT*LDR 0.015 (1.435) -0.133 (-0.833)
BOJT*RESERVE 0.903 (0.800) 0.182 (0.181)
BOJT*EQUITY 0.273 (0.261) 1.555 (1.464)
Obs. 9915 9915 9915 9915
Positive obs. 451 749 451 749
Log likelihood -4077.72 -4072.61
B.1926-1931
Failure Merger Failure Merger
Const. 4.723 (4.293) *** 0.020 (0.023) 4.693 (4.268) *** -0.038 (-0.043)
LNASSET -0.584 (-8.110) *** -0.181 (-3.179) *** -0.579 (-8.041) *** -0.177 (-3.106) ***
BRANCH 0.023 (2.086) ** -0.009 (-0.932) 0.023 (1.919) * -0.011 (-1.059)
ROA -14.714 (-7.137) *** -1.325 (-1.035) -15.195 (-7.107) *** -1.025 (-0.800)
LDR -0.001 (-0.638) 0.000 (0.104) -0.002 (-0.850) 0.001 (0.208)
RESERVE -0.008 (-0.789) -0.009 (-0.303) -0.007 (-0.661) -0.108 (-0.327)
EQUITY 1.968 (6.674) *** -0.624 (-2.220) ** 1.939 (6.457) *** -0.607 (-2.107) **
AGE 0.015 (3.072) *** 0.009 (2.596) *** 0.015 (3.205) *** 0.009 (2.577) ***
FORM -0.406 (-1.881) * 0.160 (0.840) -0.422 (-1.952) * 0.152 (0.797)
CRITERION 0.040 (0.213) 0.368 (2.847) *** 0.043 (0.228) 0.369 (2.855) ***
URBAN -0.018 (-0.121) -0.142 (-1.389) -0.042 (-0.289) -0.142 (-1.388)
QUAKE 0.920 (4.870) *** -0.151 (-0.809) 0.896 (4.720) *** -0.138 (-0.737)
BOJT -0.028 (-1.115) -0.173 (-1.103) 0.112 (0.208) -0.035 (-0.097)
BOJT*ROA -20.381 (-1.843) * -9.524 (-1.118)
BOJT*LDR 0.052 (2.724) *** -0.124 (-0.646)
BOJT*RESERVE 1.369 (1.274) 0.634 (0.578)
BOJT*EQUITY -0.030 (-0.027) 0.792 (0.624)
Obs. 7519 7519 7519 7519
Positive obs. 388 686 388 686
Log likelihood -3492.98 -3485.51